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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE V. BAKER, HOLDING REQUIRES THAT A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION BE GIVEN. 
Inclusion of a lesser-included charge to the jury in a jury-
instruction has been repeatedly appealed. The leading case on 
the issue in Utah is State v. Bakerf 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). 
In State v. Baker the Utah Supreme Court gave an in-depth 
analysis of the issue of lesser-included instructions and how to 
determine whether or not to allow the additional charge to be 
presented to the jury. In the case at bar, both the State and 
the defendant Mr. Simpson, base their arguments on interpretation 
of the Baker, case. 
The key point of contention between the State and Mr. 
Simpson with respect to the holding in Baker, has to do with 
whether there is a rational basis for acquittal on the charge in 
the information, and conviction of the lesser included offense. 
The standard which has evolved in this regard is called the 
evidence-based standard, as is widely recognized: 
The principal has, accordingly, evolved that the 
submission of a lesser degree or an included crime is 
justified only where there is some basis in the 
evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher 
crime, and yet guilty of the lower one. 
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State v. Baker at 157-158. 
The key issue in the case at bar is whether Mr. Simpson can 
conceivably be convicted of the sought after lesser included 
offense, and acquitted of the charge in the information. 
II. DEFENDANT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTIVE 
OF CONVICTION TO A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
The State argues that because Mr. Simpson asked for a lesser 
included offense instruction, but did not present evidence in his 
own behalf supporting conviction on the lesser included offense, 
the court's decision not to give the requested instruction was 
proper. The State cites Driscoll v. United States, 356 F.2d 324 
(1st Cir. 1966) in support of this proposition. In Driscoll, a 
defendant who was charged with wilfully failing to file an income 
tax return requested a lesser included offense instruction for 
non-wilfully failing to file a tax return. The trial judge 
refused to give the instruction because the defendant presented 
no evidence to contradict the finding of wilfulness. 
In Driscoll the court's holding was reasonable because The 
defendant was asking for a non wilfulness instruction when the 
only evidence before the court went to wilfulness. 
In the case at bar, the Driscoll approach is not reasonable 
because the charge in the information and the requested lesser 
included offense both require willfulness. Utah Code Annotated 
Section 41-6-13 states as follows: 
A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply 
with any lawful order or direction of any peace 
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
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maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing 
guard invested by law with authority to direct, 
control, or regulate traffic.(emphasis added). 
With respect to willfulness Section 41-6-13.5 of the Utah Code 
Annotated states as follows in pertinent part: 
An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal 
form a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, 
operates his vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard of the 
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of 
any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a 
peace officer by vehicle or other means is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree...." (emphasis added). 
In each statute there is a requirement of willfulness. 
The evidence presented by the State apparently established 
willfulness of some kind to the satisfaction of the jury. The 
question is what was Mr. Simpson willfully doing. Was he 
wilfully evading, or was he willfully disobeying the lawful order 
of a police officer? 
Despite the argument by the state, where both the charged 
offense and the lesser included offense require willfulness, and 
where the elements of each offense can be made out from the facts 
presented to the jury, there is certainly no obligation placed on 
Mr. Simpson to present evidence in his own behalf. 
The State's argument that Mr. Simpson should present 
evidence tending to prove his guilt of a lesser included offense 
advocates violating the due process clause of Article I, Section 
7 of the Utah State Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, it 
compromises Mr. Simpson's privilege against self-incrimination 
protected by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution 
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and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See 
Attached Appendix 2 and Appendix 3) . 
Whether the state is attempting to convict Mr. Simpson of a 
charged offense or a lesser included offense, the state has the 
burden of proving all of the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This Court addressed this issue in State v. 
Sorenson, where this Court stated: 
Due Process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In 
criminal cases, the prosecution is often aided by procedural 
devices which "require (in the case of a presumption) or 
permit (in the case of an inference) the trier of fact to 
conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of proof 
with respect to the presumed or inferred fact by having 
satisfactorily established other facts." Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975). Since these devices 
shift the burden of production or persuasion to The 
defendant by requiring him or her to present some evidence 
contesting the otherwise presumed or inferred fact, these 
devices must satisfy certain due process requirements. Id. 
"In criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] 
device's constitutional validity in a given case remains 
constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's 
responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the 
State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt." State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321, 325 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 60 L. Ed. 
2d 777, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979)). The use of any mandatory 
rebuttable presumption which "requires the jury to find the 
presumed element unless The defendant persuades the jury 
that such a finding is unwarranted" is one such evidentiary 
device found to be unconstitutional. Francis v. Franklin, 
471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 
(1985). See also State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State 
v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In this case, the state conceded that it could not prove 
that the offense of consumption was committed in Utah, but 
nonetheless argued there is a "presumption" that consumption 
occurred within the state unless rebutted by evidence to the 
contrary. The court adopted this view and found that, absent 
testimony to the contrary from defendant, the "natural 
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inference" and "statistical probability" was that the 
drinking occurred in the vicinity of the arrest. 
Notwithstanding the court's characterization of its basis 
for finding defendant guilty as a "factual assumption" 
rather than a "legal presumption," we find the court's 
approach unconstitutional because, semantics aside, it 
creates precisely the type of evidentiary device prohibited 
by Chambers and Turner. The approach "requires the 
[fact-finder] to find the element unless The defendant 
persuades the [fact-finder] that such a finding is 
unwarranted." State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d at 326; State v. 
Turner, 736 P.2d at 1045. 
Moreover, even if the evidentiary device used in this case 
does not fit within the Chambers-Turner definition of a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption, it nonetheless has the 
effect of relieving the state of its burden of proof on the 
fact of jurisdiction and is thus unconstitutional under the 
standard articulated in In re Winship, requiring the 
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime charged. 397 U.S. at 
364. ... 
In this case, Sorenson's conviction of the offense of 
consumption necessarily requires proof of the jurisdictional 
factor that at least some alcohol was consumed in Utah. See 
Utah Code Ann. @ 76-1-201 (1978). Though jurisdiction need 
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it nonetheless must 
be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code 
Ann. @ 76-1-501(3) (1978). The state, however, put on 
absolutely no evidence of jurisdiction but relied instead 
entirely on the presumption that the consumption of alcohol 
occurred within the state.... 
Without regard to the location of defendant's arrest, we 
find the presumption or assumption used by the court 
unconstitutional in that it shifted the burden of proof on 
the fact of jurisdiction to defendant in violation of the 
due process clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. 
State v. Sorenson, 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 758 P.2d 466, (Ct. App. 
1988). 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the failure to give an 
instruction because Mr. Simpson did not present evidence 
establishing the elements of the lesser included offense violates 
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the due process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The effect of the prosecution's 
approach relieves the prosecution of its burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged. 
Furthermore, requiring Mr. Simpson to present evidence 
establishing the lesser included offense violates his privileges 
against self-incrimination contained in Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah State Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Under the state's scenario, Mr. Simpson 
would be compelled to testify against himself in order to 
establish the elements of the lesser included offense. If Mr. 
Simpson exercises his right not to testify, then the lesser 
included offense is not given as an instruction. In effect, Mr. 
Simpson is penalized for exercising his privilege against self-
incrimination. This court suggested in Turner, that a defendant 
"should not be penalized in any way for asserting his 
constitutional right" to remain silent. State v. Turner, 736 
P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION. 
In its brief, the State argues that defendant is not 
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction because it is 
not reasonable or rational. The difficulty with this argument is 
that whether the instruction was reasonable or rational based on 
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the evidence presented to the jury was not the basis for the 
trial court's decision. The court stated: 
Okay. The reason I did not include it, for the record, 
is that the state does have the burden of proving each 
and every element that has been charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the state fails to prove, in 
effect, the last element of the eluding or fleeing 
charge, then my instructions tell the jury they are to 
find The defendant not guilty. I think that it is not 
any loss, and not even in his best interest to have a 
lesser included offense of which they might find him 
guilty. If he is guilty of the offense as charged, 
then the lesser included again is of no significance. 
Its absence, I think, is probably in his best 
interests. And counsel has noted his concerns and 
reason for it, and the psychology of jurors. We don't 
know what they do, but I think as a matter of law I 
don't think there's a reason to include that lesser 
included instruction or verdict form. 
What the trial court did in the case at bar was to take the 
decision regarding what was in the best interest of Mr. Simpson 
away from counsel. What the court did was make a decision 
regarding trial strategy for Mr. Simpson rather than allowing Mr. 
Simpson and his attorney to make the decision. This is beyond 
the discretion that is given to a trial judge. 
In an apparent attempt to justify the trial court's actions 
the State argues in its brief that in effect it was in 
defendant's best interest not to have a lesser included offense 
instruction. This argument is based on defendant's trial 
counsel's argument that Mr. Simpson may have "frozen" and not 
been able to appropriately react to the situation. The state 
argues that if that argument is correct, defendant could not have 
been convicted of either charge. 
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The state's argument is based on the proposition that 
willfulness on the part of Mr. Simpson is the same for either of 
the two charges. This is not correct. To evade, defendant had 
to have an intent to evade. This had to have been done 
willfully. This is different than willfully refusing to comply 
with the lawful order of a police officer. All defendant had to 
do to commit this crime is to know that a police officer is 
lawfully ordering him to stop, and decide not to stop. This is 
different than making a decision to evade. Contrary to the 
States argument, defendant could rationally willfully disobey an 
order, and not willfully evade. 
IV. THERE IS A RATIONAL BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE FOR THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION. 
The evidence showed that on March 8, 1994, Mr. Simpson was 
traveling South in Millard County on Interstate 15. At mile post 
163, deputies from the Millard County Sheriff's Department pulled 
behind him in their vehicles. (R. at 76-79). Mr. Simpson failed 
to respond to the flashing lights of the officers' vehicles and 
increased speed to 80 to 85 miles per hour. Mr. Simpson 
continued southbound on 1-15 for 11 miles to mile post 152. (R. 
at 79). At mile post 152, Mr. Simpson voluntarily stopped his 
car, exited his vehicle, and turned himself over to the sheriff's 
deputies. (R. at 94-95). Also brought out in trial was the fact 
that Mr. Simpson did not continue to accelerate beyond the 80 to 
85 miles an hour, nor did he attempt to take any exit along the 
way or try to get away from the officers. (R. at 93). When he 
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came to a stop it was gradual and Mr. Simpson did not "hop out of 
his vehicle and run," but complied with every one of the 
officer's orders. (R. at 94). 
A review of these facts in the light most favorable to Mr. 
Simpson clearly shows that there is a reasonable, rational basis 
in the evidence for presenting the lesser included offense 
instruction to the jury. It is certainly within a reasonable 
purview of the jury to adjudge Mr. Simpson innocent of the felony 
but guilty of the misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSION 
Requiring Mr. Simpson to present evidence establishing the 
elements of the lesser included offense in order that the jury 
receive an instruction on the lesser included offense violates 
the due process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, relieves the prosecution of their 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged, and penalizes Mr. Simpson for 
exercising his privilege against self-incrimination contained in 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution and the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Furthermore, 
a review of the facts demonstrates that there was a reasonable, 
rational basis for presenting the lesser included offense 
instruction to the jury, which could have reasonably adjudged Mr. 
Simpson innocent of the felony but guilty of the misdemeanor. 
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The lesser included offense instruction, therefore, should have 
been given. In failing to do so, the trial court committed 
reversible error. 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
trial court's ruling and grant Mr. Simpson a new trial allowing 
the jury the opportunity to decide on the lesser-included 
instruction of disobeying a peace officer. 
DATED THIS '^/[ day of May, 1995. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND P.C. 
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the current approved 'Manual on Uniform Traf-
fic Control Devices," or that portion of the road 
contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of 
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral 
support. 
(42) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street 
between the curb lines, or the lateral lines of a 
roadway, and the adjacent property lines in-
tended for the use of pedestrians. 
(43) "Solid rubber tire" means every tire of 
rubber or other resilient material which does not 
depend upon compressed air for the support of 
the load. 
(44) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting 
of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, other than 
temporarily for the purpose of and while actually 
engaged in receiving or discharging passengers. 
(45) "Stop" when required means complete ces-
sation from movement. 
(46) "Stop" or "stopping" when prohibited 
means any halting even momentarily of a vehi-
cle, whether occupied or not, except when neces-
sary to avoid conflict with other traffic or when 
in compliance with the directions of a peace offi-
cer or official traffic-control device. 
(47) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or 
herded animals, vehicles, and other conveyances 
either singly or together while using any high-
way for the purpose of travel. 
(48) "Traffic-control signal" means any device, 
whether manually, electrically, or mechanically 
operated, by which traffic is alternately directed 
to stop and permitted to proceed. 
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or 
without motive power, other than a pole trailer, 
designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed 
so that no part of its weight rests upon the tow-
ing vehicle. 
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle de-
signed, used, or maintained primarily for the 
transportation of property. 
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle de-
signed and used primarily for drawing other ve-
hicles and constructed to carry a part of the 
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck 
tractor. 
(52) "Urban district" means the territory con-
tiguous to and including any street, in which 
structures devoted to business, industry, or 
dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less 
than 100 feet, for a distance of a quarter of a mile 
or more. 
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or 
by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except de-
vices used exclusively upon stationary rails or 
tracks. 1987 
41-6-1.5. Private vehicle as emergency vehicle 
— Rules. 
The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety may make rules, consistent with this chapter, 
governing the use, in emergencies, of signal lights on 
privately-owned vehicles. The rules may include a 
REGULATIONS 
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on high-
ways — Exceptions. 
The provisions of this chapter relating to the opera-
tion of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of 
vehicles upon highways, except: 
(1) where a different place is specifically re-
ferred to in a given section; or 
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5 
and Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which 
apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout 
the state. 1987 
41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalties. 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a 
class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided. 
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 
15, and 17 of this chapter is an infraction, unless 
otherwise provided. 1993 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other 
traffic controllers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to com-
ply with any lawful order or direction of any peace 
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing 
guard invested by law with authority to direct, con-
trol, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers a t highway construction or 
maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use 
devices and procedures conforming to the la tes t edi-
tion of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control De-
vices for Streets and Highways." 1987 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's s ignal 
to stop — Fleeing — Caus ing property 
damage or bodily injury — S u s p e n s i o n 
of driver's l icense — Forfeiture of vehi-
cle — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or 
audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle 
to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or en-
danger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who 
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this 
subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and 
while so doing causes death or serious bodily injury to 
another person, under circumstances not amounting 
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony 
of the second degree. The court shall, as part of any 
sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not 
less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under 
this section or any other section, an operator 
who, having received a visual or audible signal 
from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, 
operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disre-
gard of the signal so as to interfere with or en-
danger the operation of any vehicle or person, or 
who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's 
license revoked pursuant to Subsection 
_ ,
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the conviction. If the court is unable to collect the 
driver's license, the court shall nevertheless for-
ward the report to the division. If the person is 
the holder of a driver's license from another juris-
diction, the court shall not collect the driver's 
license but shall notify the division and the divi-
sion shall notify the appropriate officials in the 
licensing state. 1993 
41-6-13.7. Vehicle subject to forfeiture — Sei-
zure — Procedure. 
(1) Any conveyance, including vehicles, aircraft, 
water craft, or other vessel used in violation of Sec-
tion 41-6-13.5 shall be subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in it, except that: 
(a) a conveyance used by any person as a com-
mon carrier in the transaction of business as a 
common carrier may not be forfeited under this 
section unless it appears that the owner or other 
person in charge of the conveyance was a con-
senting party or privy to violation of this chapter; 
(b) a conveyance may not be forfeited under 
this section by reason of any act or omission com-
mitted or omitted without the owner's knowledge 
or consent; and 
(c) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a 
bona fide security interest is subject to the inter-
est of a secured party who could not have known 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a vio-
lation would or did take place in the use of the 
conveyance; 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this section 
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon 
notice and service of process issued by any court hav-
ing jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure 
without notice and service of process may be made 
when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest to 
search under a search warrant or an inspection 
under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in 
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding un-
der this section; or 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property has been used in violation 
of the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), 
proceedings under Subsection (6) shall be instituted 
without unreasonable delay. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is 
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforce-
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
urisdiction. When property is seized under this sec-
tion, the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated 
by the warrant under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it 
to an appropriate location for disposition in ac-
cordance with law. 
(5) When any property is forfeited under this sec-
ion after a finding of the court that no person is 
ntitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited 
a the custody of the Division of Surplus Property. 
Tie director of the Division of Surplus Property shall 
**w arraicuc»9 program regarding police pursuits. 
Property forfeited under this section may not be ap-
plied by the court to costs or fines assessed against 
any defendant in the case. 
(6) When any property is subject to forfeiture un-
der this part, a determination for forfeiture to the 
state shall be made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation 
shall be prepared by the county attorney where 
the property was seized or is to be seized. The 
complaint shall be filed in the circuit or district 
court if the property is not real property and the 
value is less than $10,000. The complaint shall 
be filed in the district court if the value of prop-
erty other than real property is $10,000 or more 
or the property is real property. If the complaint 
includes property under the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court and also property under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the district court, the com-
plaint shall be filed in the district court. The 
complaint shall describe with reasonable particu-
larity: 
(i) the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; 
and 
(iii) the allegations which constitute a ba-
sis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the 
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure 
of the property which is the subject matter of the 
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, 
unless the property has previously been seized 
without a warrant under Subsection 41-6-13.7(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfei-
ture shall be filed with the court clerk and served 
together with a copy of the complaint, upon all 
persons known to the county attorney to have a 
claim in the property by one of the following 
methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last known address 
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose 
right, title, or interest is of record in the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy 
of the notice and complaint by certified mail 
to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is considered com-
plete even though the mail is refused or can-
not be forwarded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose ad-
dresses are unknown, but who are believed 
to have an interest in the property, by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county where the seizure was 
made. 
(d) Any claimant or interested party shall file 
with the court a verified answer to the complaint 
within 20 days after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this chapter, 
any interested person or claimant of the prop-
erty, prior to being served with a complaint un-
der this section, may file a petition in the court 
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in 
the property. The petition shall specify the claim-
ant's interest in the property and his right to 
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the 




Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.L.R.3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «= 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
O.eJ.Jtv. 3* 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2. 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=> 82; 
Weapons *=» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent Hr>m»in cro«_ 
the power to hear, consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246,194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196. 
False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander: defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
*= 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 





[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
ection Section 
[Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
[Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
[Disqualification to hold office.] 
Jection 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
irisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
hey reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
rivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
eprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
eny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
>ec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
heir respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
tate, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
)r the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
he members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
nts of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
Itates, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
rime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
rtiich the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
lale citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
>ec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
•resident and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
Jnited States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
lember of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
ny State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
upport the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
»on or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
hereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
isability. 
